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We address the issue of how software components are affected by the failure of one of them,
and the inverse problem of locating the faulty component. Because of the functional form of the
incoming link distribution of software dependence network, software is fragile with respect to the
failure of a random single component. Locating a faulty component is easy if the failure only affects
its nearest neighbors, while it is hard if it propagates further.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.20.Hh, 89.75.Hc
Large scale research on small-world networks began a
few years ago after the introduction by Watts and Stro-
gatz of their famous model [1]. During the last few years,
many real-life networks turned out to be of small-world
nature with a scale-free link distribution [2]. The dig-
ital world seems particularly rich in this type of net-
work at all scales: wires in computers [3], software func-
tion calls [8], source-file dependencies [5], software mod-
ules [4, 8, 9, 10, 11], Internet physical network [6], and
links between web pages [7]. Are notably missing the
networks between software packages, which will be mea-
sured in the first part of this paper.
Whereas previous work looked for reasonable explana-
tions of why software networks are scale-free [8, 11], we
address here bug propagation and debugging in scale-free
networks, a major issue that has been neglected so far.
We shall argue that software scale-free networks provide
a natural explanation of software fragility.
Scale-free networks in software were recently investi-
gated in a game and in the Java API (application pro-
gramming interface) [4]. The nodes were respectively
the modules of the game (sound, graphics, etc) and the
objects of the standard Java API. In both cases, scale-
free networks were discovered. As noted in subsequent
work [8, 9, 10], Ref. [4] did not take into account the di-
rected nature of these networks, which are asymmetric.
All these work focus on microscopic software components,
such as functions and objects. Here we study the depen-
dence between program packages in a Linux distribution,
an important structure which has not been investigated
yet, completing the hierarchy of scale-free networks found
in the digital world. We then discuss the fragility of soft-
ware with respect to the failure of a single component
and the difficulty of debugging. As large networks are
required for this study, we shall also use function call
networks of open-source projects.
Let us first study software components: a computer
uses a collection of software components that are linked
through a network of dependence. For instance a pro-
gram that displays some text needs fonts that can be
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FIG. 1: Cumulative distribution of incoming links (circles)
and outgoing links (squares) between packages in a computer
running RedHat 8.0. Empty and full symbols are obtained
with rpm -q - -whatrequires and rpm -q - -requires re-
spectively. The continuous line has a −1 slope.
provided by another component. In Linux distributions,
pieces of software are often provided as packages. As
the name indicates, a package is a collection of soft-
ware components. The rpm command can be used to
extract the network of package dependences. More pre-
cisely, rpm -q - -whatrequires myprogram lists all the
packages that needs myprogram, making it easy to build
the package adjacency matrix. One of us wrote a pro-
gram called rpmgraph that produces a diagram of this
network [12]. We studied an installation of RedHat 8.0
that contained 1460 packages. The cumulative density
P≥(q) = P (q
′ ≥ q) of the number of incoming links q
per package, is plotted in Fig. 1; we normalize P≥(q) so
that P≥(1) = 1, which amounts to leave out of P≥(q)
the nodes that are not needed by any other node. The
distribution P≥(q) has not enough points to be fitted ac-
curately with a power-law. The cumulative distribution
of outgoing links, P≥(k) for k > 0, is also plotted in Fig.
1. The asymmetry between the outgoing and incoming
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FIG. 2: Number of outgoing links versus number of incoming
links for the packages of RedHat 8.0
link distributions appears clearly.
The rpm command can give partial access to a more de-
tailed network: using the option - -requires instead of
- -whatrequires lists which components inside packages
are needed by a given package. In other words, a pack-
age is made up of a number of sub-packages, each of them
needing sub-packages of other packages. As the rpm com-
mand can only be applied to a package, the sub-package
dependency network cannot be extracted, and we are left
with the distribution of the number of incoming links,
and a coarse grained distribution of outgoing links. This
provides however a much more convincing evidence for
the power-law nature of the incoming link distribution:
a fit over the whole dataset gives P≥(q) ∝ q
−α+1 with
α ≃ 2.0.
Fig. 2 shows that the numbers of incoming and outgo-
ing links of a given software package are generally corre-
lated, a property also seen in links between functions in
source code [8]. Simply put, this shows that some pack-
ages such as libraries provide a functionality to other pro-
grams. As we shall see below, this is one of the causes of
software fragility.
In order to study bug propagation, we need better,
more precise data. Therefore we will make use of func-
tion call networks: In the latter, functions are the nodes,
and function calls are the links: in the following example
written in C,
int f(int x){
return 2*g(x);
}
f calls g, hence links to g. Large open-source programs
are ideal candidates for investigation. Refs [8, 11] consid-
ered the largest connected component. We are interested
here in whole networks, as we focus on bug dynamics and
debugging. We studied Linux kernel 2.4.18, Mozilla In-
ternet browser 1.3a, mySQL database 4.0.2, and Apache
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FIG. 3: Cumulative distribution of incoming links in Linux
(circles), Mozilla (squares), Apache (diamonds) and mySQL
(triangles). The dashed line is 1/q.
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FIG. 4: Cumulative distribution of outgoing links in Linux
(circles), Mozilla (squares), Apache (diamonds) and mySQL
(triangles).
web server 2.0.32. Extracting the function call network
from a source code written in C was done using simple
scripts. We excluded C-keywords from the graph. Fig. 3
reports that P≥(q) is also a power-law. It is noticeable
that these data seem to suffer from finite size effects sim-
ilar to those seen for the package dependences, the more
data points, the closer to 2 the exponent. We emphasize
here that α = 2 is the value that marks the border where
the average number of times a piece of software is used di-
verges when the size of the network goes to infinity. This
is possible in software because being reused does not cost
anything to a piece of software. Therefore, the average
number of programs that use a given piece of software is
free to diverge with the size of the network. The regular-
ity of the incoming link distribution exponent suggests
some sort of universality: the source code and program
networks, that is, the micro- and mesoscopic levels re-
3spectively, have roughly the same incoming link expo-
nent. The latter is also very close to exponents measured
in macroscopic networks of links between web pages and
web sites, that is, of the phenomenology resulting from
the actual use of computers and programs. At all levels,
being linked is free for the nodes.
On the other hand, Fig 4 shows the outgoing distribu-
tion, which may have power-law parts, but it is impossi-
ble to assert it from our data, because we have less than a
decade of straight line. Previous work fitted these distri-
bution with a power-law P≥(k) ∝ k
−β+1 in the part that
correspond to k ≤ 10 here and found exponents β ≃ 2.4.
If this is the case, there are strong cutoffs, much stronger
than for the incoming link distribution. On the other
hand, it seems as reasonable to fit the part 10 < k < 100
with a power law, in which case a much larger expo-
nent (more than 4) is found. However, we only conclude
from this graph that the asymmetry between incoming
and outgoing link distribution is considerable, which is
enough for our purpose.
There are indeed special reasons for this asymmetry
being more pronounced in software than in other struc-
tures. As pointed out by Ref. [8], the asymmetry it-
self is due to software reuse: some pieces of software are
designed to provide functionalities that other programs
can use. In addition, writing a program, hence linking
to previously written piece of software, is costly. As the
number of dependences of a program is related to its
complexity, the average number of outgoing links cannot
diverge. Remarkably, the asymmetry of distributions is
less pronounced for instance in links between web pages.
We argue that linking to a web page can be almost free,
in contrast to the amount of work needed to write soft-
ware pieces, which needs a logical structure, hence the
large asymmetry found here.
This leads us to bug propagation. Software is well
known to be fragile. As we shall argue in the following,
this is due in part to its structure. Assume that all the
nodes but one, drawn at random, are perfectly working.
What is the consequence of this imperfection? Software
failures actually propagate on the dependence graph: if
a node (function or software package) is faulty, the nodes
calling it are likely to work less than optimally; by exten-
sion the nodes calling a node that calls the faulty node
will probably be affected, etc. This also raise the question
of how hard is it to locate the faulty node?
Interestingly, the failure can also propagate from a mi-
croscopic software structure to a macroscopic one. For
instance, a function trying to access a memory address
outside the allocated memory space can crash the whole
program to which it belongs. If it does, the problem now
lies at the level of software packages. If the operating
system has no memory protection, this causes a system
crash. Then, if other computers depend on the system
that went down, they will also be affected.
In this paper, we shall focus on a simpler problem by
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FIG. 5: Basin size distribution of failure propagation on func-
tion call graphs. Continuous lines are for bug influence basins
and dashed lines are for debugging basins.
making simplifying assumptions on the influence of a sin-
gle bug. As many bugs are not nearly as dangerous as
illegal memory access, but (annoying) imperfections, or
faults, their influence is not as dramatic. Therefore, we
assume that the influence of a faulty node is only deter-
mined by the dependence network to which it belongs. A
node is either working (contains no bug), faulty (contains
a bug), or affected by a bug.[21]
First we consider the simple optimistic case where only
the nearest neighbors are affected by a faulty node. The
asymmetry of the structure implies that the bug propa-
gates to a typically large number of nodes. On the other
hand, once an incorrect behavior is detected, locating
the faulty node is easy. Therefore, in the most optimistic
case, software is fragile, but fixing it is relatively easy
once an anomaly is detected.
This view is however too simplistic: as shown by the
illegal memory example, bugs do propagate further than
their next neighbors. Let us be pessimistic, and assume
that they propagate as far as possible: if a node is faulty,
all the nodes that point to it directly or indirectly are
equally affected. In contrast to virus propagation, bug
influence is instantaneous. We are now left with the
study of the properties of influence basins. Of partic-
ular interest is the influence basin size distribution P (b)
which can be computed by iterating the graph matrix
G [15]. The dependence of i on j is denoted by Gi,j = 1,
(Gi,j = 0 otherwise). Element (G
n)i,j contains the num-
ber of paths of length n between i and j, hence, in order
to compute the basin size distribution, one needs to com-
pute the B =
∑N
k=0 G
k where N is the number of nodes.
If i belongs to the influence basin of j, Bi,j > 0. The
size of failure propagation basin of node j is then simply
given by bj =
∑
i sign(Bi,j). Figure 5 shows an inverse
Zipf plot of measured basin sizes: such a plot consists in
ranking the basins according to their sizes and plotting
the rank r versus b [13]. This is equivalent to integrat-
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FIG. 6: Basin size distribution of failure propagation on pack-
age dependence graph. The continuous line is for bug influ-
ence basins and dashed line is for debugging basins
ing: if P (b) ∝ b−γ , r ∝ b−γ+1.[22] The exponents of
the power-laws seem to be either −2 (Mozilla) or −5/2
(Linux); the exponent of Apache is unclear. A −2 expo-
nent was also obtained for the basins of Internet physical
network [18].
One can also define a debugging basin: suppose that
a piece of software i is affected by the failure of another
program, but is not buggy itself; what is the maximum
number of pieces of software wi =
∑
j Bi,j that are to
be inspected in order to locate the faulty node? Given
the asymmetry of incoming and outgoing link distribu-
tion, one would naively expect that P (b) and P (w) dif-
fer notably. This is clearly not the case: the debugging
basin distributions seem to follow closely their associ-
ated bug influence basins distributions, and share roughly
the same exponents (see Fig 5), although P (w) is not as
smooth as P (b), making it difficult to fit it.
This similarity is also seen in the package dependence
network (fig 6) where P (b) and P (w) have power-law
parts both with same exponent −3/2; note that our
dataset is too small to allow being definitive. In addition,
the bug influence basis distribution as a early cut-off.
It is tempting to relate the similarity between the ex-
ponents of the two basin distributions to branching pro-
cesses, which describe random tree growth. Starting from
a root node (generation 0), at time t each node i of gen-
eration t − 1 branches into a random number ri(t) of
new nodes. The average number of new nodes 〈r〉 in
the subtree is called the branching ratio. Of particu-
lar interest to us is the following property: if 〈r〉 = 1,
the subtree (i.e. basin) size probability distribution of
a randomly drawn node P (b) ∼ b−3/2. If 〈r〉 > 1 and
〈r2〉 < ∞, P (b) ∼ b−2 [16]; if the branching variance
〈r2〉 is infinite, any exponent can be obtained [17]. These
results do not apply directly to software structures, as
the latter are not perfect trees. But what branching pro-
cesses suggest is that the exponent of basin distributions
is controlled by the branching ratio and variance. The
branching ratio is nothing else than the average number
of outgoing links 〈k〉 or incoming links 〈q〉 in the context
of software structures, and both are equal. If the outgo-
ing link distribution is a power-law and has an exponent
small than 3, both branching variances are infinite. At
first, this provides an intuitive although incomplete ex-
planation of why the basin distribution exponents are
the same. Although the analogy is not perfect, it may
be that there is also some sort of universality with re-
spect to basin distributions in these networks, since the
exponent found seem to be multiples of 1/2. This is an in-
teresting open challenge. The question is whether larger
exponents, hence more robust and easier-to-debug soft-
ware, can be obtained at all. If the answer is negative,
the fragility software and the difficulty of debugging are
doomed not to be bounded in the worst case.
A still simple but more realistic model of bug propaga-
tion consists in assuming that a node linking to a faulty
or affected node is itself affected with probability p. The
rationale is the following: assume that node i calls node
j. In the context of software packages, p takes into ac-
count the fact that j, the faulty/affected node contains
sub-packages (see above) which are typically not all de-
fective/affected. Similarly, the sub-packages of i do not
all link to a faulty sub-package of j. For instance, if
there are n sub-packages in both i and j, and if there are
f faulty sub-packages in j, and if every sub-package of
i has l links that point each to a randomly chosen sub-
package of j, using elementary combinatorics, one finds
for n− f > l,
p = 1−
[(
n−f
l
)(
n
l
)
]n
= 1−
[
(n− f)!(n− l)!
(n− f − l)!n!
]n
(1)
where
(
n−f
l
)
/
(
n
l
)
is the probability that all the l links
point to a working function. Assuming that p is constant
for all the links in the network, one is left with a bond
percolation problem for directed graphs. It is known that
if the exponent of the link distribution is smaller than 3
[20], with probability 1 a finite fraction of the network
belongs to a percolation cluster, which means that the
influence of single bug is likely to be as large as if p = 1
for any value of p. Therefore, the picture drawn in the
previous paragraph and figs 5 and 6 still applies. On the
other hand, the short-tailed nature of the outgoing link
distribution implies that the basin of debugging depends
on the value of p: there is a critical value pc of p such
that for pc < p, debugging is easy, while debugging is
hard if p > pc.
Finally, another cause for software fragility comes from
the peculiar role played by libraries. As shown in fig 2,
software packages that are meant to be reused are accord-
ingly more often linked to. When a program is installed
or upgraded, it often happens that it needs an updated
version of some library. The dilemma, known as “DLL
5hell” in Windows operating systems, is the following: if
one does not install the new version of the library, the
new program is likely not to work properly. If one up-
dates the library, all the programs that link to its old
version are susceptible to be broken. This provides a
natural mechanism for progressive worsening of operat-
ing system instability. There are two solutions: either
one implements a way of using several version of libraries
at the same time, or one systematically upgrades all the
programs using the library in question. Assuming that
new versions of programs are available, the first possibil-
ity applies mostly to commercial programs, because the
cost associated with upgrading expensive software may
be very high; the second solution is the way for instance
Linux distributions work, but leads sometimes to upgrad-
ing a very large number of programs, which is frowned up
by the users. At any rate, one should not underestimate
the importance of this problem: not only the distribu-
tion of incoming links implies that the average number
of affected programs diverges with the system size, but
even worse, as shown by fig 2, libraries are characterized
by an even larger number of incoming links.
In conclusion, we argued that the fragility of software
can be in part attributed to its very structure, which
unfortunately seems to arise naturally from optimization
considerations.
D. C. thanks Paolo De Los Rios, Andrea Capocci and
Ginestra Bianconi for useful discussions.
[1] D. J. Watts , S. H Strogatz, Nature 393, 440-442 (1998).
[2] R. Albert, A.-L Baraba´si, Rev. of Mod. Phys. 74, 47,
2002.
[3] R, Ferrer i Cancho, C. Janssen, R. V. Sole´,Phys. Rev. E
64, 046119 (2001)
[4] S. Valverde, R. Ferrer Cancho, and R. V. Sole´, Europhys.
Lett. 60 (2002) 512-517
[5] de Moura et al., Phys. Rev. E 68, 017102 (2003)
[6] M. Faloutsos, P. Faloutsos and C. Faloutsos, Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM, Comput. Commun. Rev. 29, 251 (1999)
[7] Albert, R., Jeong, H., and Barabasi, A.-L., Nature 401,
130 (1999)
[8] C. R. Myers, preprint cond-mat/0305575
[9] R. Whelldon, S. Counsell, preprint cond-mat
cs.SE/0305037
[10] A. Potanin et al., techical report CS-TR-02/30 (2002)
[11] S. Valverde, R. V. Sole´, preprint cond-mat/0307278
[12] A. Lombardoni, rpmgraph
http://www.inf.ethz.ch/personal/lombardo/projects/
[13] G. K. Zipf, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least
Effort (Addison-Wesley), Cambridge, 1949.
[14] RedHat: www.redhat.com, Linux: www.kernel.org,
Mozilla: www.mozilla.org, mySQL: www.mysql.com,
Apache: www.apache.org
[15] B. Andra´sfai, Graph Theory: Flows, Matrices, Hilger,
New York (1991)
[16] P. De Los Rios, Europhys. Lett., 56, 898-903 (2001)
[17] P. De Los Rios, private communication
[18] G. Caldarelli., R. Marchetti, L. Pietronero, Europhys.
Lett. 52, 386 (2000)
[19] Albert, R. A., Jeong J., Barabsi, A.-L., Nature 406, 378-
382 (2000).
[20] Pastor-Satorras, R., Vespignani, A., Phys. Rev. Lett. 86,
3200-3203 (2001).
[21] This is somehow akin to virus propagation [20] where a
node is either susceptible, infectious or resistant.
[22] Usual Zipf plots display b versus the rank r, which is less
intuitive, as the apparent slope is −1/(γ − 1).
